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This paper responds to the minister’s paper by providing 
a context in which the government’s economic 
transformation agenda operates. It argues that it is not 
a plan but a framework for the coherent organising of 
government’s evolving involvement in the economy. To 
illustrate how this occurs the latter part of the paper 
focuses on some Auckland issues, which are yet to be 
resolved, and mentions some of the other areas for 
further development. 
Perhaps the greatest current puzzle about the New 
Zealand economy is why it is not growing more quickly. 
It stagnated from 1985 to 1993 as a result of the 
liberalisation policies of the time, even though the rest of 
the world grew strongly. At the beginning of this period 
New Zealand was a fraction above the OECD average 
measured by GDP per capita; eight years later it was 
15% or so below. The New Zealand economy has since 
grown slightly faster than the world economy, mainly 
by utilising the reserves of labour – evident in lower 
unemployment and higher labour force participation. 
But productivity growth has been low – lower than the 
long-term trend. If it continues to be low, economic 
growth will be low since the potential labour force 
reserves are now largely exhausted.
We might have expected significant productivity 
gains as the economy recovered from the shock of the 
market liberalisation policies, so that, once through the 
stagnation phase, it would have grown more rapidly 
until it returned to its pre-liberalisation track. But of 
that there is no sign. Why not? Any answer is even the 
more puzzling because export prices have been largely 
favourable, and an unusually large external (current 
account) defi cit probably accelerated the growth rate. 
But the boost given by these factors to economic growth 
and productivity is not evident in the statistics either. 
Did the liberalisation policies irrecoverably damage the 
economy? What about the intensifi cationist thesis that 
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more extreme liberalisation is needed, as if repeating 
failures of the past will generate success in the future? 
In the last seven years the Labour-led government has 
chosen a different strategy to that of its immediate 
predecessors, while maintaining some of the central 
elements of the liberalisation programme. 
The current government’s Growth and Innovation 
Framework (GIF) specifically included a ‘stable 
macroeconomic framework’, an ‘open and competitive 
microeconomy’ and a ‘globally connected economy’. 
A ‘highly skilled population’ and a ‘solid research, 
development and innovation framework’ had already 
been adopted by the previous, National government in 
the late 1990s. (New in the GIF was a ‘modern cohesive 
society’ and ‘sound environmental management’.) 
Meanwhile, some of the more extremist policy stands 
have been reversed, replaced by a pragmatic response 
to public and private ownership, a less conflictual 
approach to industrial relations, with a broadening and 
deepening of the social partnership arrangements, and 
a willingness to tackle monopoly. The government has 
also given priority to dealing with the public sector and 
social defi cits, even though the additional spending has 
given it less room for tax cuts.
Less noticed is the government’s commitment to sectoral 
engagement, dealing with each sector on a pragmatic 
rather than ideologically uniform basis. Many industrial 
sectors do not require much engagement, but, where 
they do, the government has got involved. 
The approach involves a rejection both of the implicit 
model of the market liberalisers of the 1980s, and also 
of much of the recent research paradigms of various 
agencies (including the Treasury). They treat economic 
output as a homogeneous single commodity, as if the 
composition of output does not matter. That makes 
no sense for the medium term because sectors grow 
at different rates, while many undergo significant 
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
07
37
internal change. Sectoral engagement rejects the single 
commodity approach. 
The rest of this article will focus on the Auckland strategy, 
the government’s most interesting sectoral engagement. 
Figure 1, based on recently released estimates of regional 
GDP, gives a measure of productivity per worker by 
region (using full-time employment equivalents). There 
is considerable variation. With the highest productivity is 
Taranaki, refl ecting the contribution from its (depleting) 
hydrocarbon fi elds and capital intensive petrochemical 
plants. Not far behind is the Wellington region with its 
highly paid public servants. 
(Any ranking by region refl ects sectoral composition, 
rather than some inherent merit of the region. Nor do 
the fi gures indicate the relative regional incomes, because 
they ignore tax and social security fl ows and (net) 
payments to asset owners outside the region. Moreover, 
if, say, the price of exports is higher (or the exchange 
rate lower), the relativities of rural regions would rise, 
without changes in real productivity.)
The third (and only other) region with above-average 
productivity is Auckland, strong in the business and 
transport sectors, and weak in primary production. It 
is not especially strong in manufacturing, and is slightly 
below average in tourism and education, health and 
community services. The data emphasise Auckland as 
New Zealand’s ‘gateway’ city and headquarters city. Is 
it a global city? 
The government has two major immediate concerns. 
Auckland has poorly functioning city governance and 
severe infrastructural problems – most evidently in its 
internal transport network. The government is tackling 
them – politically courageously for the fi rst, and fi scally 
courageously for the second. Given the size of the 
infrastructural defi cit, signifi cant gains are a decade out. 
Effective local authority reform may take longer. 
These are necessary and urgent reforms, but they are 
not suffi cient. Not far from the government’s thinking 
is a structural change strategy which began 70 years 
ago. The Depression exposed New Zealand’s over-
dependence on the pastoral sector and on the British 
export market. There has been much diversifi cation 
since, into other primary industries and post-farm gate 
processing, and into other export markets. The strategy 
of import-substituting industrialisation which began in 
the late 1930s unravelled in the 1980s, although it led 
to some export manufacturing.
In a globalising world, New Zealand import substitution 
faces tradeable goods and services from low wage 
countries (notably China for manufactures and India for 
services). It may be that Auckland is not a particularly 
signifi cant manufacturer because its import-substituting 
Figure 1: Regional Labour Productivity (2003)
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manufacturing has wound down. Some of the rural 
regions are more intensive manufacturers because the 
processing of primary products cannot be so easily 
carried out offshore. 
Other rich economies face similar challenges. They (often 
reluctantly) offshore routine activities and instead focus 
on the innovation, design and development stages of 
tradeable manufacturing and services, and on production 
so sophisticated that it takes a highly skilled workforce, 
not yet available in poorer countries. Can New Zealand? 
Such high-productivity production occurs in large, 
vibrant urban centres, as a result of agglomeration effects 
– economies of scale for clusters of industries. Is Auckland 
large enough to be such a centre?
The facts are that Auckland is about the 350th city in 
the world in population size, and 150th in terms of 
regional GDP. Some economists think it is big enough 
to generate the required economies of agglomeration 
(it is certainly big enough to generate the congestion). 
Others think it too small. 
My view comes from considering the biotech industry. 
There is no ‘US’ biotech industry. Rather, there are 
vigorous industries in about a dozen American urban 
agglomerations, each of which is bigger than Greater 
Auckland. 
So what Auckland biotech area should we think about? 
Surely we should add Hamilton, which is making a 
signifi cant contribution to the Greater Auckland biotech 
industry. The motorway between the two cities is to be 
completed this year. It makes sense to see the two cities 
as a single economic unit. 
If Hamilton is a part of Greater Auckland, where else is? 
There is an obvious node at the isthmus, with secondary 
nodes at Hamilton, Tauranga, Whangarei and Rotorua. 
But in the US just-in-time businesses are an overnight 
trucking away from their customers. In which case 
the entire North Island can be ‘Greater Auckland’ if 
the transport network is suffi ciently integrated. (Air 
links could add Christchurch and Dunedin for light 
valuable products, while broadband connections bring 
in anywhere for electronic transportable services.) 
Despite the pride the government takes in doubling 
spending on roading, it is probably not enough, while 
the rail system upgrade seems to have got lost. We need a 
national goal of a four-lane highway network connecting 
the seven major urban centres by, say, 2030, with an 
effective freight railway system to accompany it. 
At the moment local Auckland is too concerned with 
its own problems to think about Greater Auckland. (An 
impatient outsider might think their focus is on ‘Petty 
Auckland’.) Even the central government is so involved 
with the isthmus’s problems that it has not yet thought 
enough about the wider issue. It may be forced to, 
since the rest of the country will not take kindly to the 
apparent privileging of Auckland, not only with political 
attention and infrastructural spending: its education, 
health and recreational sectors also need upgrading 
to global city standards. The New Zealand economy 
cannot succeed without Auckland succeeding, but the 
reverse is equally true.
What about the South Island? My guess is that there 
is probably a case for developing Christchurch as a 
second hub, not in competition with Auckland but as 
a complement. Outside Christchurch and Dunedin, 
the South Island will remain primary product export 
(including tourism) focused, as will much of the rural 
North Island. But broadband may generate service 
business for those who prefer the rural lifestyle. 
The last few paragraphs go beyond the current 
economic transformation agenda. The government is 
incrementalist in its policy approach, in part because 
it eschews the big thinking of Rogernomics, but also 
because it is embarking on a much more intellectually 
complex policy development than market liberalisation, 
with (probably) fewer able advisers, given the damage 
Rogernomics did to the government bureaucracy. But 
I shall not be surprised if eventually it adopts a strategy 
of an integrated North Island with Auckland as a hub, 
and a South Island hub at Christchurch.
One could write similarly on other policy areas which 
need further development: 
• private saving requires further boosting; 
• the innovation strategy needs to pay more attention 
to international technology transfer; 
• the energy strategy is only on the way to sustainability 
after oil production peaks (and needs to be integrated 
with the transport and climate change strategies); 
• the funding arrangements for tertiary education 
continue to distort and inhibit that sector’s 
performance; 
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• the tax system is neither optimal nor equitable; 
• the implications for social cohesion remain 
unaddressed. 
Until recently I would have grumbled about the lack 
of connection between economic transformation and 
national identity. However, the minister’s paper indicates 
that this challenge is beginning to be addressed.
Other sectoral strategy issues will arise as the economic 
transformation agenda evolves. (I have a concern about 
our not effectively utilising our water resources, while 
the success or failure of the Doha Round will present 
considerable challenges to our trade negotiators, to 
exporters and, ultimately, to the economy as a whole.)
That is the point of the economic transformation 
agenda. It is not a fi xed plan, but a framework by 
which to organise the government involvement in the 
structural evolution of the New Zealand economy. The 
evolution has always been occurring, even though it was 
unnecessarily inhibited by the policies of the 1980s and 
1990s. The involvement should not slow our economic 
growth rate. It may even accelerate it.
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